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1. Introduction
Unemployment is generally greatly differentiated by the level of qualification of the 
people who access the labour market (De la Croix et al. 2002) and examination of 
the different regional entities shows that the lower the level of education, the higher 
the unemployment rate. This study proposes an analysis of the incidence of occu-
pational qualifications on the labour market from two particular standpoints. The first 
one takes account of the skill mismatch, which is seen by a loss of effectiveness in 
the matching process, while the second one considers the existence of despeciali-
sation or occupational downgrading phenomena ((vertical) job competition) in which 
the link between training and employment is weakened by a gradual desegmenta-
tion of the labour market that leads to a drop in the probability of unskilled workers’ 
being able to access the labour market. The aim of this study, which consists of a 
theoretical part and an empirical part, is to explain to what extent these phenomena 
can explain the growing gaps in the unemployment rates by level of qualification. 
The theoretical part is based on a matching model adapted to allowing for the vari-
ous forms of skill-based labour market segmentation that allows the simultaneous 
analysis of skill mismatches and job competition, which until now had been consid-
ered to be competing phenomena (Dejemeppe et al. 2000).1 The empirical part de-
scribes the findings for the Brussels-Capital Region based on statistical indicators of 
1 Unfortunately, qualifications based on experience acquired in the course of one’s career can-
not be taken into account for lack of a way to quantify them easily.  This adds some bias to the 
study.  Moreover, this bias increases with the increasing age bracket of the workers being 
studied.  The approximation will be considered satisfactory for young workers just embarking 
on their career pathways.
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A b s t r a c t
This study presents an analysis of developments 
in the qualitative flexibility of the Brussels-Capital 
Region’s labour market since the start of the 
1990s. This form of flexibility was studied simulta-
neously (rather than alternatively) from the stand-
points of the incidences of skill mismatches and 
job competition between workers with different 
levels of education ((vertical) job competition) or 
overeducation on the probability of exiting unem-
ployment for all levels of education. The conclu-
sions reveal that despite the preponderance of 
mismatches for all levels of education, occupa-
tional downgrading has a growing and significant 
impact for all the higher levels of education, espe-
cially during business cycle lows. Boosting low-
skilled employment selectively during such lows 
without boosting employment across the board 
will reduce the effectiveness of policies to combat 
the unemployment of people with low skills as 
high-skilled workers tend to spill over into less 
skilled employment segments.
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skill mismatch and job competition. This part tries to explain the specific situation of 
the Brussels labour market, which must deal with high unemployment amongst its 
low-skilled residents. The study will show that, depending on the labour market’s 
general situation, sectoral policies are not always the most suitable, given the simul-
taneous occurrence of skill mismatches and job competition (Devillé 2005). The 
second section of this study will describe the conceptual framework, the third will 
present the theoretical model in connection with different labour market segmenta-
tion assumptions, the fourth section will present the model’s outcomes, and the last 
section will present some conclusions and recommendations.
2. Description of the conceptual framework
Two mechanisms that are not mutually exclusive can explain the widening gaps 
between unemployment rates by level of education that we analyse when looking at 
qualitative or functional flexibility. The first mechanism attributes the changes in the 
unemployment rate to a structural rise in the mismatch between the skills offered 
and required on a highly segmented labour market. This mechanism, which is called 
a skill mismatch or distortion of qualifications, will lead to tightness in the labour 
market despite the persistence of high overall unemployment due to the lack of 
worker mobility between skill (or job qualifications) segments. The second mecha-
nism attributes the changes in the unemployment rate to a generalised lack of de-
mand for labour accompanied by low-skilled workers’ being crowded out of their 
segments by more skilled workers due to greater mobility between the skill seg-
ments on the labour market. This job competition or overeducation will lead unem-
ployed skilled workers to apply for jobs in segments requiring lower qualifications 
and thus to fill jobs that require lower levels of skill or formal qualifications than they 
have achieved (the “ladder effect”).
2.1. The skill mismatch
The higher tech revamping of production has generated a noticeable improvement 
in technical progress and the creation of new high-skilled jobs, whereas the restruc-
turing or abandonment of more traditional technologies that have become too costly 
and more open to competition has resulted in the destruction of many low-skilled 
jobs. The lack of downward wage flexibility, especially for low-skilled labour, has 
moreover contributed greatly to worsening the phenomenon of the substitution of 
capital for labour where the skills requirements of the new jobs that are created can-
not be met by low-skilled workers who end up in unemployment as a result of the 
restructuring of traditional technologies (Bean et al. 1990). As a result, persistent 
unemployment with large structural components has gradually taken root (Layard et 
al., 1990; Jackman et al., 1990). 
The drop in the demand for low-skilled workers can also be explained by other fac-
tors, such as de-industrialisation, the growth of the service sector (tertiarisation), the 
growth of productivity, and competition from low-wage countries. These structural 
developments have unfortunately not been accompanied by sufficient training or 
wage adjustment efforts on the lower rungs of the wage scale, efforts that would 
have made it possible to maintain the low-skilled workforce’s employability (Snees-
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sens, 1997; Sneessens et al., 1999; Sneessens & Metha, 1995, 2000; Sneessens & 
Nicolini, 2005; Van der Linden, 1997; Van Haeperen, 2001). Analysis of the labour 
market consequently reveals major sectoral tightness by level of qualification, the 
degree of which differs greatly between regions in line with the differences in their 
production structures’ sectoral make-ups. As a result, businesses may have hiring 
problems for certain skilled jobs despite the persistence of widespread overall un-
employment because the low-skilled unemployed cannot vie for the new jobs that 
are created due to their lack of qualifications (Van Haeperen, 2005).
2.2. Job competition and the ladder effect
In a situation of a general lack of job vacancies, skilled workers who cannot find jobs 
in their skill segment apply for jobs in a lower skill segment, where they compete 
with the workers in this segment. The latter will then in turn have the possibility of 
aiming for jobs on a lower rung of the ladder. The result is a ladder effect in job 
competition down to the lowest skill segment, where unskilled workers find them-
selves competing with more skilled workers without having the possibility of turning 
to another skill segment and are forced either to go on unemployment or to with-
draw from the labour market altogether. At the top of the ladder, the workers who 
accept to downgrade their skills level increase the probability of finding work, for 
they face no competition from more qualified workers in their own segment. At the 
bottom of the ladder, the probability that unskilled workers will find jobs decreases. 
In the middle rungs, occupational downgrading or “vertical job competition” is an 
interesting strategy for the segment’s worker if the probability of finding employment 
in the lower segment is greater than the decrease in the probability of finding a job in 
her/his own segment due to competition from more highly-skilled workers (Green et 
al., 1999; Hartog, 2000; Van Hoof, 1996; Denolf et al., 1996, 1999; Simoens et al., 
1997 1998). This phenomenon, which results from a mismatch between the labour 
supply and demand, is primarily a short-term phenomenon. 
From the employer’s standpoint, it may seem worthwhile to hire an over-skilled 
worker for the same wage as a worker who has the requisite level of qualifications 
for the job to be filled if the employer can avoid future training expenses. However, 
the employer may be reluctant to invest in an over-qualified worker who, if s/he fails 
to get an in-house promotion, may try to leave the firm for better employment op-
portunities in her/his own segment. From the worker’s standpoint, accepting an 
under-skilled job is a way to avoid unemployment in the short run, but makes her/
him less available for searching for work in her/his own segment. Filling an under-
skilled position for a long period of time will ultimately result in the worker’s losing 
some of the qualifications that s/he acquired in her/his initial segment. This situation 
is likely to be a negative signal for a future employer if this downgrade is interpreted 
as reflecting the worker’s inability to be hired in her/his initial skill segment. The tran-
sition to a job matching her/his initially acquired qualifications then becomes more 
difficult in the long run (Dejemeppe et al., 2000). In the long run, however, the supply 
of and demand for skills tend to meet each other, either through the adaptation of 
the less skilled job towards higher levels of skill and pay or, in the case of the gener-
alised resurgence of demand, through the worker’s departure for a more skilled and 
better paid job in her/his initial skill segment (Dolton & Vignoles, 2000; Hartog, 2000; 
Green et al., 1999).
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3. The theoretical model
I shall distinguish different skill segments i = 1,..n, and the matching function2 3.1 
from Table 3.1 for skill segment i, where Xit is the number of hirings in segment i at 
time t, Sit, is the number of jobseekers applying for jobs in segment i, Vit is the num-
ber of vacancies requiring the skill level i, α and β (>0) are the parameters of the 
matching function, and k is the efficiency of the supplier-jobseeker meeting process, 
which is assumed to be identical for all the skill segments i. This process k = ϕ (Ag, 
Tu) depends primarily upon the length of the unemployment, Tu, and the jobseeker’s 
age, Ag. 
Let us consider a situation characterised by imperfect labour market segmentation 
where the unemployed with skill level i, Ui, can offer their labour in their own and a 
less skilled segment.3 Moreover, vacancies requiring skill level i, Vi, may be filled by 
unemployed people from this segment and overeducated unemployed workers from 
the skill segment immediately above it, i+1. All of the unemployed are searching for 
work in their own segment i and a fraction λi of them are also investigating opportu-
nities in the segment immediately below it, i-1, at the same time. The supply for 
segment i, Si, is not, however, the simple sum of the unemployed in this segment, 
Ui, and a fraction of the unemployed people in the higher segment λi+1Ui+1, because 
the latter have a greater likelihood of getting job offers on level i. We shall thus as-
sign a relative efficiency parameter δi > 1 to the overeducated unemployed so as to 
weight their proportion λi in level i's supply Si4. However, it will not be possible to 
identify parameters δi and λi separately from the data in our possession. Only the 
aggregate parameter γi = δi.λi will be identifiable in the model in Table 3.1.
The number of jobseekers applying for jobs in segment i will then be determined by 
applying Equation 3.2. Similarly, the number of vacancies filled by unemployed 
workers from level i, Zi, is the sum of the vacancies filled in segment i, Yi and in 
segment i-1, Yi-1, weighted respectively by the proportions of unemployed workers 
in the total number of jobseekers in these segments, as shown by Equations 
3.3.a-c.
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2 Matching functions are exchange mechanisms between employers who create job vacancies 
requiring a specific skill level and jobseekers who have a level of training that is likely to provide 
the best possible match with the required skill level.  These mechanisms determine the number 
of workers hired at a given point of time, X, in terms of the number of workers searching for 
jobs, S, and the number of job vacancies, V. 
3 So as not to complicate this presentation of the theory unnecessarily, this example will be 
limited to the segment immediately below the one that generally accounts for more than 75% 
of the jobs derived from the higher skill levels.
4 The supply Si will be composed of a number of workers seeking employment in skill segment 
i composed of the number of unemployed from level i, Ui, and a fraction, λi+1, of the number of 
unemployed from the higher skill level i+1, Ui+1, expressed in equivalents of skill level i (stan-
dardised to 1), δi+1 Ui+1, by multiplying their number, Ui+1, by a relative efficiency parameter δi+1 
> 1. 
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The probability of level i jobseekers’ exiting unemployment is then expressed by 
Equation 3.4. I shall also consider a variable tightness indicator5 across the skill 
segments Vit/Uit that characterises the state of the labour market in segment i. This 
indicator is linked to the overall labour market tightness indicator Vt/Ut by Equation 
3.6, where ηi is a parameter that represents the coefficient of labour market tight-
ness in skill segment i. If we substitute Equation 3.5 into Equation 3.4, the probabil-
ity of level i jobseekers’ exiting unemployment is expressed by Equation 3.6.a, and if 
the expression 3.2 is substituted into Sit and Si-1t , Equation 3.6.a can be rewritten in 
its simplified form 3.6.b.
The model shown in Table 3.1 makes it possible to measure the phenomena of skill 
mismatches and job competition simultaneously instead of alternatively (Dejemeppe 
et al, 2000) in line with the differentiation of skills and business cycle conditions. It is 
nevertheless possible to isolate 
each phenomenon using spe-
cific parametric constraints 
and to measure the effects of 
these constraints on the 
model’s behaviour. This makes 
it possible to reveal the relative 
incidences of skill mismatch 
and job competition on the 
probability of exiting unem-
ployment.
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that are created in it cannot be filled by the number of available jobseekers, Ui, in this skill 
segment.  The ratio Vi/Ui then represents a tightness coefficient that will be used as a tightness 
indicator in the model shown in Table 3.1.
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(3.1) Xit = k.Sit .Vit   
(3.2) Sit = Uit + i+1.Ui+1t avec i+1 = i+1 . i+1 et i+1 > 1 ; 0 < i+1 < 1 
(3.3.a) Yit = 
Uit
Sit
 . Xit = k.Sit .Vit  .Uit 
(3.3.b) Yi-1t = 
i.Uit
Si-1t
 . Xi-1t = k. i.Si-1t .Vi-1t  .Uit   
(3.3.c) Zit = Yit + Yi-1t = k.[Sit .Vit  + i.Si-1t .Vi-1t  ].Uit 
(3.4) Pit = 
Zit
Uit
 = k.[Sit .Vit  + i.Si-1t .Vi-1t  ] 
(3.5) 
Vit
Uit
 = i . 
Vt
Ut
  
(3.6.a) Pit = k.[Sit .( i .Uit)  + i.Si-1t .( i-1 .Ui-1t) ].[
Vt
Ut
] 
 
 
(3.6.b) Pit = k.[ i .( Uit
+  +  i+1.Ui+1t .Uit )  + i. i-1 .(Ui-1t
+  +  i.Uit  .Ui-1t )].[
Vt
Ut
] 
 
 
Table 3.1. Mismatch-competition model
4. The empirical model
4.1. Analysis of the probability of exiting unemployment
In this section we shall try to identify simultaneously from the data in our possession 
the skill mismatch phenomenon and the ladder effect in job competition in order to 
determine their relative importance. This is of vital importance if one considers that 
economic policy recommendations will differ according to the phenomena that are 
identified.
The skill mismatch comes from a technological bias against low-skilled labour and 
suggests that employment potentials at lower skill levels should be preserved by tax 
incentives or policies that act selectively on the cost of low-skilled labour as well as 
to improve the low-skilled workforce’s level of education through labour supply train-
ing policies. The ladder effect comes from a generalised scarcity of jobs accompa-
nied by low-skilled workers’ being crowded out by more skilled workers and sug-
gests the need to boost employment non-selectively through government spending 
policies or tax and monetary polices aimed at economic expansion.
4.2. Data
The empirical study was carried out using the Brussels job placement agency AC-
TIRIS data in the STAT 92 socio-economic database concerning job offers received 
and filled in the course of the year and data about unemployed jobseekers for the 
Brussels-Capital Region (annual means, 1996-2005) in the STAT 93 database. 
These job supply and demand statistics are disaggregated by level of education, as 
ascertained by the last degree earned by the individual in her/his academic career. 
For this model, four levels of education were used, to wit: primary education (or no 
schooling), lower secondary education, upper secondary education, and higher 
education (short courses, long courses, and university degrees). However, these 
data do not allow one to account for the occupational skill that has been acquired 
through years of work experience, thereby introducing a skills bias that is propor-
tionate to the individual’s age. This dimension, which might be tackled by the years 
of service in the performance of a job, cannot be captured validly by the available 
data. So, the level of school education was the only parameter that could be used 
to measure skill acquisition.
Using job vacancy statistics broken down by level of education required by the em-
ployer carries biases that can cancel each other out. These are 
• a bias of over-estimating the job competition that is linked to a demand for a skill 
level below the level required so as to lower wages, and 
• an under-estimation bias linked to a demand for a skill level above the level re-
quired so as to filter the best applicants.
In addition, the announcements placed with the job placement agency account for 
only a small proportion of the vacancies on the market, and positions requiring a low 
level of education are most likely over-represented in them and strongly correlated 
with the business cycle. The data used are annual and concern exclusively the job 
announcements posted with the job placement agency. These announcements 
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels  6
Hervé Devillé, “Unemployment in Brussels: between skill mismatch and job competition. 
About the need to combine selective and comprehensive employment policies in the Brussels-Capital Region,
Brussels Studies, Issue 14, 21 January 2008, www.brusselsstudies.be
include private job announcements and offers linked to various employment promo-
tion policies.
Although this statistic is subject to caution, the starting parameters estimated from it 
(prior information) will be corrected during the simultaneous estimation, which will 
make it possible to determine the proportions of the two phenomena going into the 
explanation of the probability (a posteriori) of exiting unemployment by level of edu-
cation (see Annexe A.1 for the details of the model’s estimations).
4.3. Estimation of the model’s parameters
The outcomes of the simultaneous full information maximum likelihood estimation of 
all of the parameters of 
the complete mismatch 
and competition model 
shown in Table 3.1 are 
given in Table 4.1 below.
The tightness coefficient 
ηi increases with rising 
level of education, with 
the exception of the lower 
secondary level, where it 
is particularly low (0.66) 
and markedly less signifi-
cant. In relative terms, the 
coefficients ηri are meas-
ured with respect to the 
primary level of education 
(ηrp = 1) and reveal a ris-
ing tightness with the 
required level of educa-
tion. This has a positive 
effect on the probability of 
exiting unemployment 
and explains the dispari-
ties in this probability 
across the skill segments, 
as we shall see subse-
quently. This tightness is, 
however, half as high in 
the Brussels-Capital Re-
gion as in the Walloon 
Region for all the levels of 
education considered. 
The low tightness seen for 
the lower secondary level 
most likely results from 
the small number of job 
vacancies compared with 
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Regions Brussels-Capital Wallonia
Matching function k α (=1−β) β β
Substitution elasticities -0,644 (1,9) 0,047 0,953 (7,5) 0,62 (15,7)
Tightness coefficient c η ηr ηr
Higher education  0,049 (0,9) 2,324 (8,1) 1,29 3,62
Upper secondary education -0,085 (2,6) 1,996 (11,7) 1,11 2,12
Lower secondary education  0,003 (0,9) 0,663 (2,3) 0,37 1,21
Primary education -0,121 (2,7) 1,805 (7,5) 1,00 1,00
Spill-over coefficient γ γ
Higher education 1,44 (7,8) 4,12
Upper secondary education 0,72 (2,1) 1,23
Lower secondary education 0,27 (2,5) 0,31
Mean proportions (%) Mismatch Downgrading
Higher education 59,6 40,4
Upper secondary education 66,9 33,1
Lower secondary education 50,6 49,4
Primary education 81,7 18,3
Table 4.1. Values of the Mismatch-competition model’s parameters by skill level (level of edu-
cation). Comparison of the Brussels-Capital and Walloon Regions.
Source: Author’s estimates (the figures between parentheses are t statistics)
the number of jobseekers for this level of education, which is not very popular. The 
common trend in the state of the labour market is measured by the ratio Vt/Ut, which 
has been characterised by a falling trend since the start of the period.
The spill-over coefficient γi likewise rises with the level of education. This coefficient 
practically doubles in going from lower to upper secondary education and then 
again from the upper secondary level to higher education (tripling in the Walloon 
Region). Competition between the skill levels is thus more intense in the higher lev-
els and gradually falls off as one nears the primary school level, where the spill-over 
of jobseekers from the lower secondary school level does not seem to compete 
significantly with the jobseekers with primary educations, as emphasized by the 
gaps between the probabilities of exiting employment for these two levels of educa-
tion that will be shown below.
The mean proportions of the phenomena of skill mismatch and downgrading that 
enter into the explanation of the probability of exiting unemployment of the complete 
mismatch-competition model (Equation 3.6.b in Table 3.1) shows a predominance 
of the mismatch phenomenon for all the levels of education; a slight predominance 
for the skilled levels that is however greater for upper secondary education (67%) 
than for higher education (60%); a quasi-equality of the two phenomena for lower 
secondary education (51%); and a strong predominance of mismatching for primary 
education (82%). 
4.4. The model’s outcomes
This section presents the probabilities of exiting unemployment that the mismatch-
competition model computes for the various levels of education. By imposing differ-
ent parametric constraints on the model we can reveal the relative incidences of the 
skill mismatch and job competition effects on the probabilities of exiting unemploy-
ment according to the level of education.
4.4.1. The probabilities of exiting unemployment by level of education
Graph 4.1 below reveals that all of the levels of education are sensitive to the busi-
ness cycle, albeit with growing disparities in the probabilities’ trends according to 
the level of education and economic situation. So, during a boom in the cycle (2000 
and 2004), the probability of exiting unemployment increases with increasing level of 
education, whereas during low points (1999, 2003, and 2005), the changes in this 
probability are quite comparable across the four education categories. This under-
scores the asymmetrical effects of the business cycle on the probability of exiting 
unemployment according to level of education.
Two levels of education stand out, however:
Higher education, for which the tightness coefficient, ηsp, is the largest (2.3), thereby 
boosting the probability of exiting unemployment. The spill-over coefficient, γsp, is 
also the largest for this level (1.4), which raises the probability of exiting unemploy-
ment even more given that this level of education does not have to fear competition 
from a higher level. The phenomena of skill mismatch and job competition reinforce 
each other’s effects for this level of education, which explains the markedly higher 
values of the probability of exiting unemployment for higher education.
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Primary education, for which the tightness coefficient, ηpr, is smaller (1.81) than for 
the upper secondary (1.99) and higher education (2.32) levels, thereby limiting the 
rise of the probability of exiting unemployment. Downgrading is impossible for this 
level of education, which nevertheless faces competition from the lower secondary 
education level.
This last effect reduces the probability of exiting unemployment for the primary level. 
The effects of mismatches on the primary level and job competition on the lower 
secondary level counteract each other and only the net effect is to be taken into 
consideration in terms of the changes in the probability of exiting unemployment. 
This explains this probability’s markedly lower value for this level of education.
The secondary education levels are also markedly different from each other:
The upper secondary level of education has a smaller tightness coefficient, ηss, 
(1.99) than that of higher education (2.32), meaning a more limited positive impact 
on the probability of exiting unemployment. Its spill-over coefficient, γss, is also 
smaller (0.72) and this level also faces competition from the higher education level. 
The net effect on the probability of exiting unemployment will thus be smaller for this 
level of education than for the one above it. The effects of skill mismatches and job 
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Graph 4.1. Probability of exiting unemployment by level of education Brussels-Capital Region
Source : Author’s computations
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competition will reinforce each other, but less strongly in each direction than for the 
higher level. This explains the smaller value of the probability of exiting unemploy-
ment for this level of education than for the one above it (higher education).
The lower secondary level of education has the smallest tightness coefficient, ηsi, 
(0.66) of all the levels of education, meaning the smallest impact on the probability 
of exiting unemployment of all the levels of education. The workers with lower sec-
ondary educations, for whom the spill-over coefficient, γsi, is also the smallest (0.27),  
compete only marginally with workers with primary school educations or without 
school-leaving certificates, whereas they are subject to stiff competition from upper 
secondary school graduates (whose spill-over coefficient γss, at 0.72, is more than 
double theirs). The net effect of their competing for jobs on a lower level thus also 
has a negative impact on the probability of exiting unemployment, which is com-
pounded by that of the tightness effect, thereby leading to a lower probability of 
exiting unemployment for the lower secondary than for the primary education level. 
This may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, this atypical behaviour of 
the lower secondary education level can be explained by the fact that for such low-
skilled levels, employers prefer unskilled workers, whom they can pay less than 
overqualified workers, who will be scarcely more operational than primary school 
graduates but demand higher wages.
4.4.2 Impacts of skill mismatch and the ladder effect
In this section we shall analyse the respective contributions of skill mismatches and 
job competition on the formation of the probability of exiting unemployment by level 
of education. To this end, we shall consider the reference version of the complete 
model6, where the tightness parameter ηi is set at 1 and the spill-over parameter γi 
at 0 for all of the levels of education so as to annihilate the effects of the tightnesses 
and spill-overs on the probability of exiting unemployment. I shall then show the 
probability deviations resulting from different positions of these parameters compa-
red with the reference model so as to be able to isolate the effects of skill mismatch-
ing and job competition within the mismatch-competition model as a whole. 
a) Primary education level
Graph 4.2 shows the deviations in the probability of exiting unemployment from the 
reference model (no tightness and spill-overs) for the primary education level. We 
can see that the presence of tightness on the labour market that calls upon the pri-
mary education level (ηpr = 1.8) increases the probability of exiting unemployment 
compared with the reference model in line with changes in the business cycle. This 
probability increases by 16% during the 2003 crest and by only 9.4% during the 
2003 trough.
Workers with primary school educations face job competition from lower secondary 
school graduates with no possibility of downgrading their status. This situation leads 
to a drop in their probability of exiting unemployment compared with the reference 
Brussels Studies
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situation with the absence of tightness and spill-overs so as to be able to isolate the effects of 
mismatches and job competition and then take account of them simultaneously (for their ef-
fects are not additive in a non-linear model).   
Hervé Devillé, “Unemployment in Brussels: between skill mismatch and job competition. 
About the need to combine selective and comprehensive employment policies in the Brussels-Capital Region,
Brussels Studies, Issue 14, 21 January 2008, www.brusselsstudies.be
model. Moreover, this drop is also dependent on the business cycle, falling by 2.3% 
during the 2000 crest and by 0.25% during the 2003 trough.
b) Lower secondary education level
Graph 4.3 shows the deviations in the probability of exiting unemployment from the 
reference model for the lower secondary education level. Unlike the other levels of 
education, this level is less tight than the primary education level (ηsi = 0.66). Con-
sequently, taking account of the phenomenon of a skill mismatch leads to a de-
crease in the probability of exiting unemployment for this level compared with the 
reference model that increases as the business situation improves (-4.3% in 2000 
versus -2.25% in 2003).
When it comes to job competition, the negative effect on the probability of exiting 
unemployment that is linked to competition from the upper secondary education 
level prevails over the positive effect that is linked to downgrading towards the pri-
mary education level, so that the net effect of the ladder effect on the probability of 
exiting unemployment will also be negative throughout the period, with an exacerba-
tion of this effect linked to the low point in the business cycle at the end of the pe-
riod (-2.8% in 2003 versus -2.2% in 2000). 
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Graph 4.2. Deviations in probability of exiting unemployment in the Brussels-Capital Region. Primary education level
Source : Author’s computations
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As the two effects are mutually anticyclic, they annihilate each other partially and the 
net effect will change the probability of exiting unemployment compared with the 
reference model only slightly, so that it will become positive during peaks in the eco-
nomic cycle (0.1% in 1998 and 0.33% in 2000) and remain negative throughout the 
rest of the period, especially during the low points at the end of the period (-1.6% in 
2003).
c) Upper secondary education level
Graph 4.4 shows the deviations in the probability of exiting unemployment from the 
reference model for the upper secondary education level. This level has a higher 
relative level of tightness than the primary education level (ηss = 1.99). Consequently, 
the skill mismatch phenomenon leads to a greater increase in the probability of exit-
ing unemployment compared with the reference model than for the primary educa-
tion level in line with changes in the business cycle (23.7% during the 2000 peak 
and 13% during the 2003 trough) 
When it comes to job competition, unlike the case for the primary education level, 
the net effect is slightly positive during the business cycle lows at the start and end 
of the period (1.15% during the trough of 2003), for the increase in the probability 
that is linked to occupational downgrading prevails over the decrease in probability 
linked to competition from the higher education level during these periods. The net 
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Graph 4.3. Deviations in probability of exiting unemployment in the BCR. Lower secondary education level 
Source : Author’s computations
effect is negative throughout the rest of the period, especially during the business 
cycle peak in 2000 (0.66%), for the drop in the probability that is linked to competi-
tion from the higher level prevails this time over the rise in the probability that is 
linked to downgrading during this period. 
Despite the fact that the effects of skill mismatch and job competition are additive 
during business cycle lows and counter each other during high points in the eco-
nomic situation, the probability of exiting unemployment increases more strongly 
compared with the reference model situation during the peak situation of 2000 
(11%) than during the lows (7.25% in 2003). During the economic peak of 2000, the 
probability increased greatly under the major pressure of the positive effect of the 
skill mismatch (23.7%) despite the negative effect of job competition (-0.66%), 
whereas during the low point of 2003, the probability increased more moderately, 
under the more limited pressure of the skill mismatch’s positive effect (13%), despite 
the more marked positive effect of job competition (1.15%).
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Graph 4.4. Deviations in the probability of exiting unemployment in the BCR. Upper secondary education level
Source : Author’s computations
d) Higher education level
Graph 4.5 shows the deviations in the probability of exiting unemployment com-
pared with the reference model for the higher education level.
When it comes to the skill mismatch, the tightness that appears in the market re-
garding the higher education level increases the probability of exiting unemployment 
over the reference model’s value less strongly (17.5%) than in the upper secondary 
education segment (23.7%), despite a larger tightness coefficient (ηsu = 2.3 versus 
ηss = 1.99). This may be due to a greater heterogeneity of skills, which would reduce 
mobility within this segment and consequently the tightness coefficient’s effect on 
the probability of exiting unemployment.
When it comes to job competition, the effect is positive throughout the period and 
more strongly so than for the preceding education levels (2.9% for the higher educa-
tion level versus 0.66% for upper secondary education and -2.2% for lower secon-
dary education in 2000), for this level of education is not subject to competition from 
a higher level.
The two effects are superimposed on each other in this case and the probability of 
exiting unemployment compared with the reference model is markedly higher than 
for the other levels of education (23.6% for higher education versus 10.9% for upper 
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Graph 4.5. Deviations in the probability of exiting unemployment in the BCR. Higher education level 
Source : Author’s computations
secondary education7 and 10.6% for primary education in 2000). The deviation is 
practically double that of the upper secondary level and increases with improvement 
in the business cycle (2.2% in 2000 versus 1.8 in 2003).
4.4.3 Proportions of skill mismatch and occupational downgrading in the 
model
Graphs 4.6 and 4.7 below show the proportions of the probability of exiting unem-
ployment by level of education that are explained by the phenomena of skill mis-
match and job competition, respectively8.
Graph 4.6 above shows that the proportion of skill mismatch is predominant in ex-
plaining the probability of exiting unemployment for all the levels of education. How-
ever, its impact declines with increasing level of education (except for the atypical 
case of lower secondary education, where it is close to 50%) and its business cycle 
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increases by only 0.33% compared with the reference model’s value, is excluded from the 
comparison because the skill mismatch and job competition effects, which are anticyclic, 
largely cancel each other out.
8 The estimation of parameters η and γ of the model makes it possible to determine endoge-
nously the optimal proportions of the two phenomena in the adjustment of the probability of 
exiting unemployment.
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Graph 4.6. Proportions of probabilities of skill mismatch by level of education explained by the model for the BCR
Source : Author’s computations
sensitivity is anticyclic and likewise decreases with increasing level of education. The 
skill mismatch proportion thus tends to become more structural as one moves to-
wards higher levels of education (upper secondary and higher education).
The complementary proportion of spill-over (the “ladder effect”) shown in Graph 4.7 
below plays an increasing role with increasing level of education and its sensitivity to 
the economic situation is procyclic and decreases with increasing level of education. 
The proportion of job competition from above has a significant impact for the higher 
education level and the atypical lower secondary level.
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Graph 4.7. Proportion of spill-over probabilities by level of education explained by the model for the BCR
Source : Author’s computations
5. Conclusions and recommendations
This study involved an attempt to include the skill mismatch phenomenon and lad-
der effect9 in one model to explain the probabilities of exiting unemployment of sev-
eral categories of jobseekers with different levels of education.
The biases that a number of other studies have documented (Dejemeppe, Cockx, & 
VanderLinden, 2000; and Van Haeperen, 2005) also apply to the ACTIRIS data that 
feed the STAT 92 database and concern the qualifications that employers require in 
their job announcements. These biases either over-estimate the qualifications that 
employers require to fill job vacancies, according to certain approaches, in order to 
select the best applicants, or under-estimate them, according to other approaches, 
in order to keep salaries down.
The assumption here was that the two approaches could offset each other and the 
“prior” information collected in this way would be corrected a priori by the complete 
model’s simultaneous estimations. This assumption then made it possible to identify 
the two phenomena and to include them in a model that could adjust endogenously 
the two phenomena’s proportions in the explanation of the variance of the probabil-
ity of exiting unemployment for the various education levels considered. 
The economic literature acknowledges the co-existence of a structural skill mis-
match revealing a technological bias against the less skilled or educated workers 
and job competition (occupational downgrading) that has an anticyclic component 
that increases during periods of recession and a structural component linked to 
imperfect information about the match between jobseekers’ profiles and the jobs to 
be filled on the labour market. However, the literature remains divided as to the rele-
vance of job competition compared with the structural skill mismatch in explaining 
the rising trend of unemployment among the least skilled workers. These factors are 
usually attributed to market imperfections and asymmetries in the information held 
by employers and workers that cause poor matches, the effects of which can per-
sist for the medium term.
The model put forward shows that, although the skill mismatch has a preponderant 
role in explaining the probability of exiting unemployment for all the levels of educa-
tion, job competition has a rising and significant role for the higher levels of educa-
tion.
This finding has consequences for short-term economic policy recommendations. 
The selective boosting of low-skilled jobs can be achieved by policies acting upon 
the cost of this labour or by tax stimuli aimed at keeping pockets of low-skilled em-
ployment in the region. These policies must nevertheless be accompanied by gen-
eral employment support policies during periods of recession in order to limit the 
ladder effect in job competition, which puts an additional squeeze on the less quali-
fied jobs during such periods.
Now, this type of job is far from negligible in the BCR. We effectively see that in 
2005, for example, 67% of unemployed jobseekers registered with the Brussels job 
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ployment have been measured by competing models estimated alternatively with data for the 
Walloon Region (Dejemeppe et al., 2000)
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placement agency ACTIRIS had lower secondary, primary school, or no education 
whereas only 33% had higher levels of education: 21% moderately educated (upper 
secondary school graduates) and 12% highly educated (higher education gradu-
ates).
In the longer run, we can suppose that this component is adjusted by an upgrading 
of the tasks that are required of over-qualified personnel or by the latter’s redeploy-
ment in higher-level jobs. The general job structure is thus redefined in favour of this 
type of job.
Whether the surplus supply of low-skilled labour results from a technological bias on 
the demand side or a recomposition of the labour supply through the ladder effect in 
job competition, employment policies can act only on maintaining pockets of low-
skilled employment in the short run and increasing the mean level of education of 
the labour supply in the longer run. This would make it possible to develop and ex-
pand new activities requiring more skills and qualifications, especially in the business  
services, communications (NITC) 10, and financial services sectors, which tend to 
concentrate more in urban areas such as the Brussels-Capital Region.
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ANNEXES
A. Estimation of the model
Before going ahead with an estimation of the complete model integrating skill mis-
match and job competition simultaneously, we shall estimate the two phenomena 
separately11.
A.1 Estimation of the matching function
The empirical findings are given in Table A.1 below. This table compares the elastici-
ties12 with respect to jobseekers, α, and job vacancies, β, by level of education and 
for the entire Brussels-Capital 
Region. These elasticities are then 
compared with those of the Wal-
loon Region and Kingdom of Bel-
gium as a whole.
The elasticity with respect to job 
vacancies is particularly high in the 
Brussels Region (0.95) and con-
trasts with that of the Walloon 
Region (0.62), although the latter 
is still above 0.5, and that of the 
Kingdom (0.4), which is closer to 
those of most European countries 
(0.3). This high elasticity attests to 
the fact that hirings in Brussels 
depend primarily on the job va-
cancies that businesses an-
nounce, which make up the short 
side of the market and are rela-
tively independent of the labour 
reserve. The matches’ poor elasticity with respect to jobseekers also indicates little 
sensitivity to the labour market’s degree of tightness and a limited impact on the 
firms congestion effect.
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11 The estimations of the separate models for skill mismatch and job competition, in which the 
spill-over, λi, and tightness, ηi, coefficients are set at 0 and 1, respectively, will make it possible 
to constitute prior information, the parameters of which can then be introduced, as starting 
information, into the FIML estimation for the complete model11. The estimations of the parame-
ters for the mismatch and competition models also operate recursively on the basis of a prior 
estimation of the matching functions by skill level.
12 Elasticity measures the relationship between two variables.  Elasticity with respect to the job 
vacancies shows the incidence of the variation in the number of job vacancies on the number 
of jobs that are filled.  It is measured as follows:  The elasticity of the jobs filled with respect to 
job vacancies = variation in jobs filled (in %) over the variation in the number of job vacancies 
(in %).
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Regions - Levels of qualification k α (=1−β) β
Brussels-Capital Region 0,64 (1,9) 0,05 0,95 (7,3)
Higher education 0,56 (5,0) 0,19 0,81 (5,6)
Upper secondary education 0,93 (3,7) 0,06 0,94 (11,2)
Lower secondary education 0,51 (1,3) 0,01 0,99 (8,1)
Primary education 0,76 (3,5) 0,08 0,92 (12,8)
Walloon Region 0,57 (12,1) 0,38 0,62 (15,7)
Belgium 0,35 0,61 0,39 
Table A.1. Values of the matching function parameters by level of qualifications 
(education). Brussels-Capital Region vs Walloon Region 
Source: Author’s estimates
The elasticity with respect to the jobseekers increases with the level of education 
(0.1 from primary to higher education), thereby attesting to the workforce’s sensitiv-
ity to the matching process, which increases with the level of education. 
Given the small variations in the elasticities for the jobseekers and job vacancies 
throughout the skill segments, they can be considered to be constant for these 
segments and equivalent to those of the entire Brussels Region (all segments com-
bined) in the model.
Estimating Equation A.4 in the mismatch model for all the skill segments i will enable 
us to obtain the values of the residual parameters of tightness ηi . Similarly, estimat-
ing Equation A.7.b in the job competition model for all the skill segments i will enable 
us to obtain the values of the residual parameters of spill-over γi .
A.2 Estimation of the parameters in the complete mismatch-competition model
By introducing the values of these parameters as starting values in Equation 3.6.b of 
the complete model (Table 3.1), we can simultaneously estimate, by full information 
maximum likelihood estimation, all of the parameters in this equation.
A.3 List of the model’s variables and parameters
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α Elasticity of job supply with respect to hirings
β Elasticity of job vacancies with respect to hirings
γ i Product of the parameters  of proportion λi and relative efficacy δi (not identifiable separately)  of the jobseekers of 
level i who are looking for jobs in the lower segment i-1
δi Relative efficiency of the matches of workers from a higher segment i+1 who apply for jobs in the lower segment i 
(δ > l)
ηi Relative tightness coefficient of segment i compared with the entire labour market
λI Proportion of level i jobseekers who are looking for jobs in the lower segment i-1
k Efficiency of the jobseeker-potential employer meeting process
f Concave matching function growing with respect to each of its arguments
t Time variable representing the trend or technical progress
Table A.3.1. List of the parameters in the Mismatch-competition model
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Xi Number of workers hired in skill segment i
Si Number of workers seeking employment in skill segment i
Vi Number of vacancies requiring skill level i
Ui Number of unemployed with skill level i
Yi Number of job vacancies in segment i filled by level i unemployed
Zi Number of job vacancies in segment i filled by level i 1unemployed Yi and i+1, Yi-
Pi Probability of exiting unemployment for the level i unemployed
i Index representing the skill segment or level of education
Table A.3.2. List of the parameters in the mismatch-competition model
